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Abstract
This paper studies a simple endogenous growth model to explain growth slowdowns. It is
designed to explain, for example, the middle income trap often observed in the south-east Asian
countries, the U.K.s productivity puzzle after the Great Recession and the lost decades of Japan
in a unied framework. It is based on the Romers (1990, JPE) variety expansion model with
additional state variable, which we call the R&D environment. The R&D environment is a
sort of social capital that captures the research network and culture, societys attitude towards
research activities, and so on. Together with the non-negativity constraint of the labour supply,
this additional state variable generates multiple steady states (balanced growth paths, BGPs).
The model has three BGPs, of which the middle one is unstable (explosive) while the other two
satisfy the saddle path stability with high and low R&D activities. Without stochastic shocks,
the model exhibits strong initial state dependency, meaning that even only small di¤erence
in the initial state could lead to a large di¤erence in the long-run. With stochastic shocks,
occasional shifts between two stable BGPs can occur. The model o¤ers an intuitive explanation
why a nancial shock is particularly important for growth slowdowns. Interestingly, before a
growth slowdown, a nancial malfunctioning raises the stock return. Finally, our model is fairly
realistic in the sense that it allows us to do calibration exercises which are rather standard in
the business cycle studies.
KEYWORDS: endogenous growth; growth slowdown; dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model; middle-income trap; natural resource curse; productivity puzzle; R&D;
o¢cial development assistance
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After the Great Recession around 2007-8, the U.K. has experienced the slowdown of the labour
productivity; known as productivity puzzle. Although it is widely recognized as the stagnation of the
labour productivity, not surprisingly, it coincides with the attening of the total factor productivity
(TFP); see Figure 1. Japan also has experienced a similar but much longer and deeper phenomenon
after the bubble burst at the beginning of 1990s; see Figure 2. Interestingly, both countries have
experienced the growth slowdown after some nancial turmoil. This paper aims to explain these
growth slowdowns quantitatively in a reasonably realistic economic growth model.
A growth slowdown is a long-lasting, signicant decline of growth rate. It is not specic to high-
income countries. The economic model developed in this paper also encompasses the "middle income
trap"; typical examples include Latin American countries. The standard economic growth theory
tells us that low-income countries should grow faster because they tend to accumulate production
capital at a faster rate (Solow e¤ect). Actually, many countries has successfully escaped from low
income levels, but, out of 101 middle income countries in 1960, only 13 of them is classied as high
income countries in 2008; see Larson, Loayza and Woolcock (2016, World Bank).
Extending Romers (1990) seminal paper, our model has an additional state variable, which we
call the R&D environment, to capture social culture (scientists attitudes toward business, etc.), legal
system (including patent laws and property rights), R&D infrastructure (such as innovators networks
and education systems), and so on. We can regard the R&D environment as an intangible social
capital, which has the following two properties; (a) society accumulates the R&D environment as an
(intangible) asset by conducting R&D; and (b) the R&D activities are more productive when the
R&D environment takes a higher value. For (a), an important assumption is such an accumulation
of social asset is a positive externality of the R&D activities; i.e., the researchers do not intend to
improve the R&D environment, when they engage in R&D. For (b), we want to capture, for example,
higher education institutions are better prepared for the commercialization of academic ndings when
business innovations and inventions are more active.
In our model, there are two stable balanced growth paths (BGPs, long-run equilibria); one with
positive R&D activities and the other without them. This is intuitively because of vicious and
virtuous cycles. Around the BGP with no R&D, there is a vicious cycle; once R&D becomes inactive,
it deteriorates the R&D environment, which itself discourages the R&D activities. Similarly, there is
a virtuous cycle in the good BGP.
If there are no shocks (or only small shocks) in the model, then the fate of an economy depends
on its initial condition. In our model, depending on the initial state, its nal destiny  good BGP or
bad BGP  is predetermined. Note importantly that in our model, even an economy moves toward
the bad BGP, still it grows at a faster rate in early periods through the capital accumulation (Solow
e¤ect); it fails to switch from the capital accumulation as a growth engine to the R&D driven growth.
We argue that countries that successfully transited from the middle-income level have had a R&D
environment good enough to attain this transition; such as Japan andWest Germany after the WWII.
This is the explanation of the middle-income trap in our model; see Figure 6.
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If there are some shocks in the model, even if they are temporary, still they can have long-run
e¤ects. We assume that after a successful innovation, innovators can set up a rm, meaning that the
rm value is the reward to innovations. Like Comin and Gertler (2003, AER), because the rm value
is the present value of the current and future prots, R&D is more active in booms. Unlike Comin and
Gertlers medium cycle e¤ects, however, business cycle uctuations can have very persistent e¤ects
in our model; this is because a shock may push out an economy from one BGP to the other. For
example, if an economy experiences a bad external shock, output, rm prot and rm value decline,
which in turn discourages innovations. If such a bad shock is large enough and lasts long enough,
the dormant R&D activities during the recession may deteriorate signicantly, which hampers R&D
even after the end of the negative external shock. In our model, this is the mechanism behind the
growth slowdown in Japan and the U.K.; see Figure 8.
There are several policy implications. First, to help escape from the middle-income trap and the
long-lasting growth slowdown, we need a big push. For example, a large scale ODA as a positive
external shock may be required. Second, however, the type of ODA matters. In our model, improving
production e¢ciency and increasing nal goods demand do not help escape from the low BGP, because
there are two e¤ects that o¤set each other. On the one hand, these shocks increase the rm prot and
rm value, which stimulates the R&D activities. However, on the other hand, the production sector
and the R&D sector compete each other in the factor market (labour market in our model). Hence, in
our model, if the production e¢ciency improves, the production sector absorbs more labour, squeezing
out the R&D sector from the labour market. There is anecdotal evidence of type of phenomenon;
e.g., Wall Street and City have taken many scientists from universities and other research institutes
such as NASA. In addition, this story is in parallel with the leading exposition about the natural
resource curse; if the extraction of natural resources are very protable, the natural resource sectors
absorb too much production factors such as labour, squeezing out high productivity growth sectors
such as manufacturing. Hence, if they only improves production e¢ciency, building bridges, roads
and power plants, for example, has little e¤ect in total. Third, our numerical experiments suggest
that the nancial sector e¢ciency has a strong e¤ect. If the nancial market is malfunctioning, the
rm value may be discounted unduly. In our model, because the rm value is the reward to successful
R&D, such a mispricing of the rm value discourages the R&D e¤orts. This is reminiscent of the fact
that the U.K. and Japan have experienced the growth slowdown after the nancial market turmoil;
see Figure 9.
In conclusion, this paper asserts that a sort of intangible social assets such as culture, legal
system, etc. are important for R&D. Our model has multiple BGPs. Even though an economy
has experienced a rapid growth via capital accumulation (Solow e¤ect), it may fail to switch to the
R&D driven growth (middle-income trap). In addition, even though a country successfully achieved
a high-income level, it could slip down from the good BGP, particularly if it su¤ers from deep and
long nancial turmoil (like Japan and the U.K.). To regain the sustainable R&D environment, the
model suggests the following policy prescriptions; (i) policy measures that directly a¤ect the R&D
productivity such as the subsidy to higher education and R&D tax credit and (ii) policies to improve
the e¢ciency in the nancial market.
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TFP and Stock Price in Japan
Stock Price
TFP (LHS)
Figure 1: Source: Japan Industrial Productivity Database 2015 (JIP2015). The TFP growth rate is
converted into the level. TOPIX means Tokyo Exchange Stock Price Index.
1 Introduction
To explain growth slowdowns, this paper develops a simple model which is an extension of Romers
(1990, JEP) variety expansion model. The key feature of the model is that it has two stable balanced
growth paths (BGPs); one with positive endogenous growth and the other without it.1 Throughout
this paper, the BGP with positive endogenous growth is called the high BGP, while that without
endogenous growth is called the low BGP (also, steady state is interchangiable to BGP in this
paper). Our model explains a growth slowdown as a move from the high BGP to the other, while the
Rostows take-o¤ takes place when an economy moves from the low BGP to the other. The model is
fairly realistic in the sense that it allows us a reasonable calibration exercise, which is rather common
in the business cycle studies.
Here, a growth slowdown means a signicant decline in the rate of economic growth for a certain
long period. For example, Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2013, NBER) dene growth slowdown as
a 2%-point decline or more in the growth rate in successive 7-year period. They nd that such
growth slowdowns tend to occur in middle income countries, hence called middle income trap. The
middle income trap is a concern of policymakers as well as academics. Actually, World Bank, Asian
Development Bank, etc. have discussed growth slowdowns (focusing on the middle income trap)
repeatedly.2 But, a growth slowdown can also happen to high income countries. Indeed, in our
calibration exercises, what we have in mind is the growth slowdown experienced by Japan in 1990s
and 2000s, which is often called "lost decades" after the bubble burst at the end of 1980s, and the
1Actually, the model has one more BGP, which is however explosive (locally unstable), between the high and low
BGPs. Because the unstable BGP is sandwiched by the other two, the model exhibits global stability.
2See, for example, Im and Rosenblatt (2015) and Felipe, Kumar and Galope (2014).
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TFP and Labour Productivity in U.K.
Labour Productiv ity
TFP (RHS)
Figure 2: Source: Blunden and Franklin (2016) and ONS. The TFP growth rate is converted into
the level.
productivity puzzle in the U.K. after the great recession in late 2000s; see Figures 1 and 2. For the
latter, the shift in the TFP trend is one of the major reasons of the slowdown of the U.K. labour
productivity growth. The model developed in this paper is however applicable to study the middle
income trap and the poverty trap.
Our model extends Romer (1990) model by introducing an additional state variable, which we call
the R&D environment. The R&D environment in this paper loosely captures a wide range of social
and institutional environment surrounding R&D activities. It includes for example social culture
(scientists attitudes toward business, etc.), legal system (including patent laws and property rights),
R&D infrastructure (such as innovators networks and education systems), and so on. Although there
are some controversies in each of them, given so many economic and non-economic papers in this eld,3
their collective importance seems rather obvious. In this paper, rather than cutting into the details
of each aspect of these, we consider an abstract state variable (the R&D environment), which has the
following two properties; (a) the better the R&D environment is, the higher the R&D productivity
is; and (b) society accumulates the R&D environment via R&D activities. Property (b) says, for
instance, inventors research networks tend to be well developed when inventions are more active;
higher education institutions are better prepared for the commercialization of academic ndings
where business innovations and inventions are more active, and so on. In this respect, importantly, we
assume an externality; individual inventors do not take into account the e¤ect of their R&D activities
on the R&D environment, which is a society-wide variable. This positive feedback (externality) is the
key mechanism to generate multiple BGPs in our model. Intuitively, if an economy obtains a high
level of the R&D environment, then the higher R&D productivity encourages more R&D activities,
3Actually, rather than saying "so many", we could say that there are "too many" to cite. To name a few, see
Samila and Sorenson (2017), Audretsch and Keilbach (2004), Beugelsdijk (2010) and Freeman (1991).
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which in turn supports the accumulation of the high R&D environment. Contrarily, once R&D
activity is disturbed for a long period, the R&D environment deteriorates, which discourages R&D
activities. That is, there are virtuous and vicious cycles between individual inventions and societys
R&D environment.
Methodologically, we apply quantitative techniques that are rather common in the business
cycle studies. As in Comin and Gertlers (2006, AER) "medium-term cycles", the business cycle
uctuations have impacts on R&D activities. In addition to their "medium-term" e¤ect, however,
in our model, temporary shocks may also have a "long-term" e¤ect, in the sense that if a shock is
either strong enough or long-lasting enough, an economy moves from one BGP to the other. The
mechanism behind medium-term e¤ects (transition dynamics generated by a shock) is the same as in
Comin and Gertler (2006). For example, consider a temporary productivity improvement. It raises
output and hence increases the rm prot, meaning that the rm value also increases. Because this
class of models assume that after a successful invention the inventor sets up a new business, a higher
rm value means a higher reward to successful inventions. Because it encourages the R&D activities,
the TFP growth increases during the period when the productivity is high.4 In this way, business
cycles matter in economic growth.
Our quantitative exercises however nd that the productivity has only a little impact on TFP.
In our model, as in the original Romer model, the production and the R&D sectors compete each
other in the factor markets. More particularly, these two sectors compete in the labour market,
because the model assumes that each inventor uses only labour in her R&D activities, given social
level of R&D environment and past knowledge accumulation. This generates the second channel; if
a higher output level increases labour demand in the production sector, it pushes up wage. A higher
wage however increases the cost of R&D, discouraging inventions. Because the improvement in the
productivity in the production sector has these two o¤setting e¤ects, its impact on R&D is very
small. Actually, we have stronger theoretical result in terms of the long-term e¤ect. That is, because
these two channels o¤set each other exactly, the production e¢ciency (exogenous productivity shock)
and the government expenditure (exogenous demand shock) are neutral in the BGPs; they have no
long-run e¤ects on R&D at all.5 The main reason why our results are so di¤erent from Comin and
Gertler (2006), cutting into the gist point, lies on the fact that our shocks last longer than theirs,
because we are rather interested in decennial economic uctuations. Note that, even in our model,
the production e¢ciency and government expenditure have some e¤ects on R&D in the transition
periods.
This has stark policy implications. For example, consider an o¢cial development assistance
(ODA). Certainly, the model suggests that a big-push is necessary to achieve Rostows take-o¤, in
the sense that there must be something big that pushes out an economy from the low BGP. However,
the model also suggests that the type of ODA matters. Suppose an ODA improves the production
e¢ciency of a country forever, by building a new power plant, new road, etc., which presumably
improves the production e¢ciency. Then, the level of the income per capita of this country will
4As usual, we dene TFP growth as the output growth that cannot be explained by the growth or capital and
labour.
5Rephrasing this, these two shocks have no e¤ects in comparative statistics.
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increase, which however is a one-o¤ lift-up of income. At the same time, working in the production
sector becomes more attractive than working in the R&D sector, which discourages R&D activities.
This sort of ODA does not support sustainable growth.
Note that this intuition itself is not new. Indeed, one of the leading expositions of the natural
resource curse is that a high productivity sector (natural resource extraction) absorbs production
factors, squeezing other sectors such as manufacturing where the productivity growth is faster.6 In
our model, the sector squeezed is not the sector with a fast productivity growth, but the R&D sector.
Also, unlike the natural resource curse story, a high productivity in the production sector is not
negative for R&D. Nonetheless, the competition in the factor markets is the key both in this model
and in the natural resource curse story.
Then, what shocks matter for R&D in the long-run? Of course, an exogenous improvement in
the R&D productivity has a sharp e¤ect; not surprising. What is interesting is that the R&D is
very sensitive to the e¢ciency in the nancial sector. The intuition is as follows. Recall that the
rm value (share price) is the reward to successful inventions. Suppose that investors require high
risk-premium in the stock investment, because of a nancial ine¢ciencies. Then, given level of rm
prot, due to a higher discount rate (a higher risk-premium), the stock price is lower. This lower
reward to business inventions discourages R&D activities.
Moreover, the stock market boom is tightly related to growth slowdowns in our model. Consider
the scenario, in which an economy starting from the high BGP moves to the low BGP after a long
nancially ine¢cient period. In this model, interestingly, during the period of a negative nancial
shock, the stock return increases (not decreasing), and then this economy goes to the low BGP. We
cannot label this stock market boom as a "bubble", because our model has only rational agents. In our
model, behind the increase in the stock return, a negative nancial e¢ciency disturbs nding channel
to the R&D sector which discourages working in the R&D sector, shifting labour temporarily to
production. This increases output per rm and hence rm prot. There is a discrepancy between the
aggregate economy and individual rms; while a low level of inventions decreases the aggregate output
growth by reducing the speed of the creation of new varieties (creation of new rm in our model), the
output and prot of each incumbent rm increases due to the labour shift. This mechanism sheds
light on many episodes, where there were nancial boom and bust prior to the growth slowdown such
as Japans lost decades and the U.K.s productivity puzzle. We could include the growth slowdown
experienced by the Asian countries after the Asian nancial crisis in the mid 1990s.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, which is the extension of
the discrete time version of the Romers variety expansion model. Section 3 discusses the parameter
selection and the steady states. While Section 3 investigates the transition dynamics when there is no
shock. Section 4 considers the dynamics with shocks. We particularly focus on the two scenarios; one
for a growth slowdown after a long-lasting nancially distressed period, and the other for Rostows
take-o¤. Section 5 discusses several relevant issues. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
6See for example Frankels (2010, NBER) survey.
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2 The Model
This paper discusses the discrete time version of the model.7 The model is a simple extension of
Romers variety expansion model. Although the model is almost standard, to introduce the notations,
we show the model setup and the equilibrium equations. A reader who is familiar with Romer (1990)
may want to skip Section 2.1 and jump to Section 2.3. See equations (1) and (2) for the equilibrium
equations, and Tables 2 and 3 for notations.
2.1 Model Setup and First Order Conditions
The model overview is as follows. The representative household (HH) consumes the consumption
goods, saves via bonds and supplies labour. The HH saves only via the bonds issued by the nancial
intermediary (FI), which in turn invests in capital and equity. The representative nal goods producer
(F-rm) uses intermediate goods Xi,t (M-goods, variety i) and production labour HY,t to produce
nal goods Yt (F-goods), which is allocated into consumption Ct, investment It and government
expenditure Gt. The intermediate goods producers (M-rms) use only capital Kt to produce Xi,t,
which is sold in the monopolistically competitive M-goods market. The inventors only uses R&D
labour HA,t. If an invention is successful, a new variety is created, then the successful inventor sets
up a new rm. The value of a new rm is Vt, which is nanced by the nancial intermediary through
the stock market. In this version, prices are exible and the only friction is the exogenously given
risk premium on the stock investment.
Setting aside some minor modications, the only major di¤erence from Romer (1990, JPE) is that
we introduce a sort of social capital Zt, which captures the R&D environment. When Zt is higher,
R&D productivity is higher. In addition, the R&D environment improves when R&D is more active.
2.1.1 Household (HH)
The representative household (HH) inelastically supplies labour Ht, which (exogenously) grows
at nt = Ht/ Ht−1; we however set nt = 1 (no population growth) in the calibration. We keep this
notation to discuss the e¤ects of population growth later; see Section 6.4. HH allocates HY,t to
production and HA,t to R&D; Ht = HY,t + HA,t. This additivity in the labour supply implies that
the required wage rates for production and R&D must be the same. The non-negativity constraint of
HA,t ≥ 0 (HY,t ≤ Ht) may or may not bind, while HA,t ≤ Ht (HY,t ≥ 0) never binds due to the Inada
property of the production function. HH also consumes and invests in capital and R&D indirectly
via purchasing bonds BNt . We denote R
NB
t,t+1 as the gross nominal return of the bonds between time
t to t+ 1 issued by the nancial intermediary (FI). Likewise, Λt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor
(SDF) from time t to t + 1. Tax τG,t and prots from F-rms Π
Y
t and M-rms Π
X
t are lump-sum.
7We also have developed the continuous time version (analytical derivations only), which is available upon the
request.
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HY,t +HA,t ≤ Ht with HY,t ≤ Ht
ln βt,τ = (τ − t) ln β +
Pτ
i=t+1 ln ζβ,i for τ ≥ t
The rst order conditions (FOCs) are as follows.
∂BNt+1 : 1 = Et [Λt,t+1/πt,t+1]R
NB
t,t+1











TVC : limt→∞ ΛtBt = 0
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Note that aggregate consumption Ct
is the consumption per head times population. Dening consumption per capital as ct = Ct/ Ht, the
SDF is Λt,t+1 = ζβ,t+1β (nt+1ct+1/ct)
−σ.
2.1.2 Financial Intermediary (FI)
A nancial intermediary (FI) raises funds from HH by issuing bonds BNt , while it provides funds
to intermediate goods producers (M-rms) in two ways. The one is via contingency claims for their
capital investment and the other is the purchase of the share of newly established M-rms. In our
notation, NXt is the number of shares of M-rms, and R
C
t,t+1 is the return on the claims on capital
lending BKt+1. To match the equity premium in the data, we add risk-premium parameter cv, which
is constant in this version. As a shareholder, FI obtains both income gain (prot per rm ΠXt times




t , where V
X
t is the value of an M-rm, while
































− V Xt N
X
t+1 (equity investment for R&D)
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The rst order conditions (FOCs) are as follows.
∂BNt+1 : 1 = Et [Λt,t+1]R
NB
t,t+1 (same as the HHs FOC)
















2.1.3 Final Goods Firms (F-rms)
The nal goods rm (F-rm) purchases intermediate goodsXm,t fromM-rms, and they aggregate
Xm,t into Xˆt. Then, F-rm combine Xˆt with labour HY,t to produce nal goods Yt, which is
divided into consumption Ct, investment It and government expenditure Gt. Parameter ζY shows the




































Note that Xˆt and Pˆ
X
t are the Digizt-Stiglitz quantity and price indices of intermediate goods. If






α dm. That is, the
production function reduces to the formulation that is exactly the same as Romer (1990, JPE). But,
there is no reason to believe this coincidence.8
The rst order conditions (FOCs) are as follows.
Wt = (1− α)Yt/HY,t
PˆXt = αYt/Xˆt
We shortly show that the equilibrium is symmetric, Xm,t = Xt and Pm,t = Pt for all m. Note
8See Section 2.3.4 for further discussions on this.
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that Xˆt 6= Xt and Pˆ
X
t 6=

















2.1.4 Intermediate Goods Firms (M-Firms)
There are many intermediate goods rms (M-rms), each of which has monopolistic power. Hence,
they earn a positive prot, which is the incentive for inventions. Because each M-rm produces a
particular variety of M-goods, the "number" of M-rms and the "number" of the varieties of M-goods
are both At. An M-rm m produces Xm,t only by employing capital Km,t with xed productivity ηK .
Capital depreciation is δK and capital investment is Im,t. Consistently from the previous subsection,



























Xm,t = ηXKm,t (M-goods production)
BKm,t+1 = Km,t+1 (balance sheet constraint)
Km,t+1 = (1− δK)Km,t + Im,t (law of motion of K)











t−1,t − (1− δK) (λ
X
m,t is marginal cost)
The latter shows that the marginal cost λXm,t is the same for all M-rms, and hence the former
shows that their sales prices PXm,t are the same as well; i.e., the equilibrium is symmetric. Dene a
shorthand notation α˜ = (θx − 1) /θx, which is implicitly assumed to be α in Romers (1990, JPE)
parameterization.















Then, from F-rms FOC of Xˆt, we obtain
RCt−1,t = α˜αYt/Kt + (1− δK)
Also, substituting Xˆt out from the F-rms production technology, we obtain the aggregate production
function














, which is one under Romer parameterization (θx = 1/ (1− α)).
2.1.5 Inventors
Using labour input HA,t, inventors create new variety A
new
t of M-goods. Once they invent a new
variety, they set up a new rm, which has the value of V Xt (value of one rm). In the "production
function" of R&D, there are two externalities. First, inventors take the stock of past knowledge At
as given. This is the classical R&D externality, to generate endogenous growth. In addition, we
introduce another externality through R&D environment Zt. This works as a sort of non-tangible
social capital, which captures the societys R&D environment. If Zt per worker takes a higher value,
R&D is more productive. Also, importantly, we assume that Zt is accumulated via R&D activities;
that is, if the share of R&D labour in the total labour is larger, Zt increases. This says that the
R&D environment improves when the R&D is active. We also assume that the R&D environment
deteriorates at the rate of δZ . Parameter zL prevents the low BGP from being an absorbing state;
Zt approaches to zL > 0 if HA,t = 0 for all t. If Zt is a constant, the model reduces to Romer (1990,




s.t. Anewt = ζωA,tωA
Zt
Ht




+ δZzL + (1− δZ)Zt (lom of aggregate Z˜t)
At+1 = A
new
t + (1− δA)At





ΠXt+1 + (1− δA)
V Xt+1
	
(banks FOC for reference)
The rst order conditions (FOCs) are as follows.






where the Lagrange multiplier t is 0 only when the non-negativity condition of HA,t is not binding.
If it is binding (HA,t = 0), Wt is not equal to the labour productivity in the R&D sector, due to
t > 0. Typically this happens when Zt is low. In the production sector, on the other hand, Wt =
12
(1− α)Yt/HY,t holds always. Hence,









t if t = 0
HA,t = 0 and HY,t = H otherwise





















Finally, we assume that the government expenditure is a constant percentage of the output along
the BGPs. Also, in this simple version, prices are exible and there is no monetary policy.
2.2 Equilibrium Equations
The equilibrium equations are summarized in (1). In our notation, γX,t is the gross growth rate
of Xt from t− 1 to t; γX,t = Xt/Xt−1.
lom of Z : Zt+1 = ωZ
HA,t
Ht
+ δZzL + (1− δZ)Zt (1a)






+ (1− δK) (1b)






+ (1− δA) (1c)














bond return : 1 = Et [Λt,t+1]R
NB
t,t+1 (1f)
SDF : Λt,t+1 = ζβ,t+1βλt+1/λt (1g)










F-goods Mkt : Yt = Ct + It +Gt (1j)
MPk : RKt−1,t = α˜αYt/Kt (1k)




















It is a bit involved to obtain the balanced growth paths (BGPs), not because we have multiple
BGPs but because we explicitly take into account the shocks and expectations. The fact that there
are three BGPs does not prevent us from rewriting equations only with the stationary variables. Also,
note that having multiple BGPs does not prevent the standard time iteration solution algorithm.9
We have multiple xed points in the state space, which does not prevent the use of the standard
non-linear solution methods. We have a unique xed point in the function space (space of the
policy functions), which is what the standard projection method algorithm seeks. Hence, given an
initial state, we can uniquely pin down one equilibrium; i.e., given the initial state, we can uniquely
determine a transition path. The detrended equations are as follows.
lom of Z : Z˜t+1 = ωZH˜A,t + δZzL + (1− δZ) Z˜t (2a)








+ (1− δA) (2c)










rm prot : Π˜Xt = (1− α˜)αY˜t (2e)
bond return : 1 = Et [Λt,t+1] R˜
NB
t,t+1 (2f)
SDF : Λt,t+1 = βζβ,t+1γ
−σ
t+1λ˜t+1/λ˜t (2g)
MU : λ˜t = C˜
−σ
t (2h)









F-goods Mkt : Y˜t = C˜t + I˜t + G˜t (2j)
capital demand : RKt−1,t = γ H,ssα˜αY˜t/K˜t (2k)
labour demand : W˜t = (1− α) Y˜t/H˜Y,t (2l)














To obtain the BGPs, we normalize each endogenous variable by dividing its proper growth factor;
see Table 1. We call this detrending and we add tilde on the resultant variables. The steady states
of the detrended equations (2) are called BGPs. Later, to discuss the quantitative model behavior,
we do reverse detrending to obtain the value of each variable that is comparable to the data.
Table 1 says that basically quantities are divided by AϕAt Ht, while prices are unchanged with some
exceptions. Wage should not be divided by the population size, because it is of per worker from the
rst place. Similarly, rm prot and rm value are of one rm, and hence they should not be divided
9A less obvious key to the unique equilibrium is the fact that the middle steady state is explosive. If counterfactually
the middle steady state were excessively stable (indeterminate), then it would not be possible to pin down a unique
equilibrium (transition path). For an indeterminacy model solved by a projection method, see, for example, Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001, JET) "Perils of Taylor Rules".
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Table 1: Detrended Variables
types of variables notes




capital: K˜t = Kt/Γk,t, whereΓk,t = A
ϕA
t
Ht−1 = Γt/γ Ht








t and Z˜t = Zt are unchanged
wage: W˜t = Wt/Γw,t, where Γw,t = Γt Ht
rm prot and rm value: Π˜Xt =
ΠXt /Γv,t and V˜
X
t =
V Xt /Γv,t, where Γv,t = ΓtAt
hours: H˜A,t = HA,t/ Ht and H˜Y,t = HY,t/ Ht
others: marginal utility λ˜t = λtΓ
σ
t
by the number of M-rms At.
10 Also, we need to pay careful attention to capital. Because Kt+1 is
known at the end of time t, to maintain its "predetermined" nature, we do not want to divide it by
Ht+1. We instead divide Kt+1 by A
ϕA
t+1
Ht−1, because At+1 is know at time t. Hence, K˜t is always
followed by γ H,t = Ht/ Ht−1. Note that the growth rate of TFP γA,t+1 = At+1/At is also a time-t
variable in terms of information (At+1 is also predetermined).
2.3 Key Mechanisms and Key Properties
2.3.1 Why Business Cycles Matter
First, we want to discuss the mechanism by which business cycles a¤ect R&D activities, though
this is the same as Comin and Gertler (2006, AER). The equation of rm prot (1e) shows that the
prot of an M-rm is proportional to the output per rm. Because M-goods play a similar role to
capital, if the capital share α is larger, the M-rms share is also larger. Also, because each M-rm
has some monopolistic power, it is more protable when the demand for M-goods is less elastic (recall
1− α˜ = 1/θx). Because a successful inventor can establish a new rm to commercialize her invention
of a new variety of M-goods, the rm value is the reward to successful inventions. Hence, any shocks
that can a¤ect output at least potentially have some e¤ects on R&D activities.
Note however that prot is not the only factor that determines the rm value. The equation of
rm value (1d) shows that, because the rm value is the sum of the discounted current and future
prots, the discount rate also matters Λt,t+1/cv, where Λt,t+1 is stochastic discount factor and cv
is exogenously given risk premium on the stock investment. That is, if the stock market requires
high equity premium, given the same current and future prot ow, the price of a rm becomes
lower. The e¢ciency in the nancial market matters. We study such a nancial shock by considering
time-preference shock ζβ,t+1; see equation (1g).
2.3.2 Why Financial Shock is Important
In our model, the production and R&D sectors compete with each other in the labour market.
This means that, something good for production is not necessarily good for R&D. Consider an
10See Section 2.3.4 for further discussions.
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improvement in the production e¢ciency, for example. On the one hand, as discussed above, it
increases the reward to R&D activities, through a higher rm prot. On the other hand, however, it
increases the cost of R&D labour; that is, given higher e¢ciency level of production, the production
sector absorbs more labour, which raises its o¤ered wage. As a result, the R&D sector is crowded
out in the labour market. In our model, these two e¤ects exactly o¤set in the BGPs. Similarly, an
increase in the government expenditure leads to a rise in production. But, though the rm prot
increases, the wage cost is also increasing. In the steady states, the government expenditure has no
e¤ect on the level of R&D. The following proposition summarizes these results more precisely.
Proposition:
In the system of equations (2), the following three parameters do not a¤ect the growth
rate of any balanced growth paths:
- production e¢ciency level ζY
- government expenditure level Gss/Yss
- capital depreciation rate δK
The proof is, though tedious, straightforward; see Appendix. Note that these parameters do
a¤ect the income level, but do not a¤ect the growth rate of income. Note also that this proposition
concerns only BGPs; in this sense, this proposition is of comparative statics. Taking into account
transition dynamics, a permanent change in some of these parameters has some e¤ect on the income
level. But, such an e¤ect through transition periods is very weak because we focus on very persistent
shocks. Contrarily, the R&D level is very sensitive to the time preference shock and is even more
sensitive to the shock to the equity premium. Although such shocks temporarily a¤ect the output
level and hence the rm prot, they directly a¤ect the discount rate and hence a¤ect the rm value.
This explains why the growth slowdown often takes place after nancial crisis.
2.3.3 Why There are Multiple BGPs
The model has multiple BGPs, because of the R&D environment Zt. Suppose that, due to some
reason, R&D labour HA,t is low for a long period. In this case, the R&D environment deteriorates
at the rate of δZ . Once Zt becomes low enough, R&D is not productive anymore, which discourages
working in the R&D sector. In a sense, there is a vicious cycle between HA,t and Zt. On the other
hand, suppose that, due to some reason, the R&D productivity increases for a long period. In this
case, even though Zt is low, the R&D may be protable. Having high HA,t, the society accumulates
Zt gradually. Once Zt becomes high enough, the R&D productivity is high enough even if the R&D
productivity returns back to the original level. High Zt and high HA,t support each other in this
scenario. Hence, with shocks, an economy can move from one BGP to the other,but such a shock
must be large enough (big-push story). Without shocks, however, an economy is trapped in one of
two stable BGPs and cannot escape from it. Or, starting from an arbitrary point in the state space,
it goes to one of two stable BGP, which is its destiny. Hence, the model exhibits a stark initial state
dependence in the case of no shocks. We shortly discuss these issues in the quantitative experiments.
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2.3.4 Di¤erences from Romer (1990, JPE)
In this subsection, we want to clarify rather minor di¤erences from Romer (1990), other than
the addition of the R&D environment Zt. First, we rather focus on the transition dynamics, and
hence we have a couple of shocks; shock ζωA,t to the R&D productivity and the time-preference shock
ζβ,t+1 in this version. Second, although we allow the possibility that a variety becomes obsolete in
our model setup, we have the depreciation δA of At to be zero in our calibration exercises. Third,
we add the exogenous equity risk premium cV . This is only for a calibration purpose; without this,
although the model dynamics is little a¤ected, the price-earnings ratio is too low, comparing to the
data. Financial shocks are caused by ζβ,t+1.
Fourth, we assume that the elasticity of substitution among the varieties θx is a free parameter.
We need to discuss a couple of issues related to this. In Romer (1990), it is implicitly assumed
that θx = 1/ (1− α), but there is no reason to think that the substitutability among M-goods is
determined by the capital share α. Actually, this parameter is quite important to match the steady
state values to the data. This is because the incentive for the R&D is the value of a new rm that an
inventor can establish after a successful R&D, which in turn is higher when the monopolistic power
of the new variety is stronger. A low substitutability of M-goods (low θx) implies a high markup and
hence a high rm prot. Also, because M-goods play a similar role to capital in Romer model, θx
a¤ects steady state capital as well. One additional comment is that, when we reverse detrend the
variables, the average rm size Vt is shrinking over time if θx < 1/ (1− α) along the high BGP.
11
It may seem as if it is inconsistent with the data. But, note that our model assumes that one rm
produces only one variety, but in reality one rm produces many varieties. That is, the value of one
rm Vt is actually the business value of one type of M-goods in this model. Because of this, even
though the company size is not shrinking in the data, we should not compare it with our Vt. Unlike
rm prot and rm value, the price/earnings ratio and stock return are comparable to the data.
Lastly, our model explicitly takes into account the occasionally binding non-negativity constraint
of labour supply, which is not new. Actually, this possibility is already discussed by Romer (1990).
3 Parameter Selection and Steady States
3.1 Parameters
Our basic strategy is to choose the parameter values based on the RBC literature (if they appear
in RBC models). These parameters include β, σC , α, δK and Gss/Yss.
12 For the parameters specic
to this model, we target the several key data moments. Because we solve the model by a fully non-
linear method, it is not really easy to dene and compute the steady states with shocks. In this













. Since Π˜Xt and V˜
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are shrinking as At grows. Actually, At is growing along the high BGP (At is not growing at the low BGP). Note









and α˜ = (θx − 1) /θx, if θx = 1/ (1− α), then α˜ = α and ϕA = 1.
12For the U.S. marco caribration, see Cooley and Prescott (1995) among others.
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section, hence, we loosely target the values in the non-stochastic steady states.
Very roughly speaking, there are the following correspondences between parameter values and the
steady state values. First, higher R&D productivity ωA tends to generate higher growth rate γA,ss
in the high BGP. Second, given α and β, the elasticity of substitution θx among intermediate goods
a¤ects capital output ratio in the steady state. Note that β = 0.995 implies that the annual risk-free
rate is 2%. Third, the risk-premium on the stock investment cV is related to the price/earnings
ratio (P/E). For zL, which is the long-run value of Zt in the low BGP, we set 0.5, but we just have
zL > 0 to avoid Zt = 0; for this purpose, zL works as long as it is a small positive number. For the
depreciation rate δZ of Zt, we have little clue to pin down this parameter value. Actually, unlike zL,
δZ plays an important role in the transition dynamics, because it controls the speed of the decrease
in Zt when there is no R&D labour supplied.
13
Finally, we assume that one period corresponds to one quarter in our parameterization.
Table 2: Parameters
Symbol Value Note
β 0.995 discount factor
σC 1 intertemporal substitution
α 0.38 capital share
δK 0.012 capital depreciation
Gss/Yss 0.18 govt expenditure share in steady states
ωA 0.2 productivity in R&D
δZ 0.1 depreciation of Zt
zL 0.5 lower bound of Zt
θx 2.8 elasticity of substitution of M-goods
cV 1.025 1 + risk premium on stock investment
ζY 1 production e¢ciency level
δA 0 depreciation of At
γ H,t 1 1 + population growth rate
ηX 1 productivity in M-production











We have three steady states but because the middle steady state is explosive we focus on the
low and high steady states. In our model we assume that the government expenditure is 18% of
the output. Given the parameters shown above, consumption is 63% and 65% while investment is
19% and 17% in the high and low steady states, respectively. These numbers are quite reasonable.
Capital output ratio is 10 and 14 in the high and low steady states, respectively (it is higher in the
13See Footnoe 23.
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low steady state). In annual term, they are 2.6 and 3.6, respectively. The value of 2.6 for the high
steady state might seem to be slightly too low, in particular comparing to the U.S. data, but recall
that, in light of our model structure, some portion of non-tangible assets should be deducted from
the total capital. Taking into account this, we think 2.6 is quite reasonable. Also, our P/E ratio is
19 and 32, respectively, which also seem to be reasonable comparing to the market data; see Shiller
(2006)14. Certainly, the market data is limited to the listed companies, which are usually large and
established rms. However, the P/E ratio in the data varies signicantly among markets, and hence
it seems to be not really fruitful to ne tune the parameter values for this number.
Table 3: Steady State Values
low unstable high
Zss 0.5000 0.8783 1.3742 R&D environment
Kss 73.4208 57.7337 35.6347 production capital
Vss 23.0324 16.7273 9.0808 rm value
Css 3.3148 2.9160 2.2954 consumption
γA,ss 1.0000 1.0066 1.0240 growth rate
HY,ss 1.0000 0.9622 0.9126 production labour
Yss 5.1170 4.5599 3.6735 output
Kss/Yss 14.3485 12.6611 9.7005 capital/output ratio
Css/Yss 0.6478 0.6395 0.6249 consumption/output ratio
Iss/Yss 0.1722 0.1805 0.1951 investment/output ratio
RK,ss 0.0170 0.0193 0.0252 capital return
Wss 3.1725 2.9383 2.4957 wage
Πss 0.6944 0.6188 0.4985 rm prot
Vss/Πss 33.1667 27.0297 18.2145 price/earnings ratio
Finally, perhaps the most controversial variable is the labour share of R&D, which is respectively
9% and 0% in the high and low steady states. For the low BGP, it may seem to be strange to have no
R&D activities at all. We could easily lift up the lower bound from 0% to some (exogenously specied)
positive level, by tinkering the model. But, because such a cosmetic modication of the model does
not change the model implications at all, while it brings unnecessary complication, we rather opt
to have 0% in the low BGP. For the high BGP, the OECD for example provide a comprehensive
R&D data,15 which says the researchers share is around 1% in many countries and never exceeds
2%. In our model, under a reasonable parameter range, it seems to be very di¢cult to have such
a low R&D labour share, in particular, without making a model extremely sensitive to the external
shocks. However, we anyway believe that we should not follow the OECD statistics. There are
three reasons. First, in our simplied model, we assume that R&D requires labour input, which
is not really true in reality. Often, the research activities require unproportionally large resources.
According to the date of the World Bank, the R&D expenditure share in GDP is 2.55% for OECD
countries.16 Second, we should take into account the research activities in the higher education and
14For the U.S. price-earnings ratio, see http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
15For the share of RnD labour, see http://www.oecd.org/innovation/inno/researchanddevelopmentstatisticsrds.htm
16See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS.
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non-prot research institutions. Finally and most importantly, we dene our R&D more broadly than
the o¢cial statistics. Although the exact data coverage in the World Bank and OECD statistics may
di¤er among countries, picking up the U.S. as an example, the denition of R&D is often followed
by the word of "systematic studies". Here, in this model, we would like to study more broader
activities, which are less systematic and less formal R&D activities. Indeed, for example, U.K.s
innovation survey regards innovation as a much wider concept than their R&D denition.17 Our
position is more or less close to it; our R&D includes not only formal and systematic studies, but
also includes less formal business enhancement activities.







Table 4 shows the roots of the detrended dynamic model (2) around its non-stochastic steady
states. In our formulation, while we have two state variables (production capital K˜t and R&D
environment Z˜t), there are also two dynamic jump variables consumption C˜t and rm value V˜t, the
dynamics of which are expressed by the expectational equations. Hence, only the low and high steady
states are saddle-path stable. The middle steady state is explosive (unstable).
To see why the middle BGP is explosive, consider Figure 3, which shows the competition between
the production and R&D sectors in the labour market. In this gure, we (i) we do not impose the
wage equalization between the R&D and production sectors in equations (2), and (ii) treat H˜A,t as a
parameter. Note that these labour demand curves are not monotonically downward sloping, because
as labour share changes the capital level and other variables change. As expected, the points at which
the wage equalization holds (W˜A,t = W˜Y,t) are the steady states (BGPs). In addition, the upper left
circle also indicates the steady state, at which the non-negativity constraint on the R&D labour is
binding (H˜A,t = 0) and hence the wage equalization does not need to hold (W˜A,t < W˜Y,t). Around
the middle steady state, the slope of W˜A,t is steeper than that of W˜Y,t. This means, for example,
if H˜A,t exceeds its middle steady state value slightly, the R&D sector o¤ers a higher wage than the
production sector, which attracts more H˜A,t. This occurs due to the externality; if more people
engages in the R&D, the R&D productivity improves which in turn attracts more R&D labour. In
contrast, around the high steady state, the opposite happens. Unless the deviation from the high
steady state is not too large, there is a mechanism that forces an economy to return back to the high
steady state.
17For the U.K. innovation survey, see
https://www.ons.gov.uk/surveys/informationforbusinesses/businesssurveys/ukinnovationsurvey
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Figure 3: Labour Demand by RnD and Production Sectors
4 Dynamics in Non-Stochastic Case
Even without shocks, the model has transition dynamics. In this case, the model exhibits the
stark initial state dependency. To understand the model behavior, look at Figure 4. It is a sort of
phase diagram.18 The red thin lines are the nullclines of Z˜t, on which Z˜t+1 = Z˜t. Similarly, the blue
dotted line is the nullcline of K˜t, on which K˜t+1 = K˜t. The transition of capital is simple in the sense
that if K˜t is below its nullcline, it increases, and vice versa. The transition of R&D environment
Z˜t is a bit complicated. If it is very low, more specically if it is lower than zL, which is 0.5 under
our parameterization, Z˜t increases toward zL, which is the autonomous increase even with zero R&D
labour H˜A,t = 0. Above zL, Z˜t decreases if it is too low or too high. In particular, for low K˜t, Z˜t
decreases for its entire range. This is because R&D is not protable enough, if capital accumulation
is too low (because rm output and prot are low as well). For K˜t high enough, Z˜t is increasing if it
is in the middle range; Z˜t is increasing within the tongue shape area surrounded by the red curved
thin line in the upper middle area. In this area, capital is accumulated enough, and Z˜t is not too low
or not too high. If Z˜t is too low, it supports only low level of R&D labour H˜A,t, which is not enough
to o¤set the depreciation of δZZ˜t, while if it is too high, though H˜A,t is high, its depreciation is also
large.
18We say "a sort of", because, unlike the standard phase diagrams in economics, we omit dynamic jump variables
(consumption C˜t and rm value V˜t). Together with two state variables capital Kt and R&D environment Zt, we have
four dimensions, which is not possible to plot. Instead, Figure 4 is the projection of this 4D space into the state space,
which is 2D.
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Figure 4: Nullclines and Demarcation Line. In the area left of the black broken line, there is no RnD
activities; HA,t = 0.
The points that satises both Z˜t+1 = Z˜t and K˜t+1 = K˜t are steady states in the detrended
variables (i.e., BGPs). The upper left circle shows the low BGP, in which H˜A,t = 0. Actually, at any
point left of the black broken line, H˜A,t = 0. Under our model assumptions (i.e., unless we assume
some exogenous growth engine), this implies that γA,t = 0; no endogenous growth takes place. In the
neighborhood of this point, the model behavior is quite similar to the Cass-Koopmans neoclassical
model without endogenous growth engine. The lower right circle shows the high BGP, in which
H˜A,t > 0. In the high BGP, Z˜t is high enough to support H˜A,t > 0, which in turn maintains a
certain level of Z˜t. Hence, the economy grows endogenously. Near the high BGP, the model behaves
similarly to the Romer model. The low and high BGPs satisfy the saddle path stability condition
(i.e., stable), while the middle BGP is explosive. For the middle steady state, only if an economy
starts exactly at that point, it can stay there. However, even with a very tiny shock, it starts moving
toward either of the two stable states.
Starting from any point other than three steady states, an economy shows transition dynamics
toward the low or high BGP; see Figure 5. The distance of two successive dots shows the change
in the state in one period (one quarter). It tends to be shorter and shorter as a locus moves to
the stable BGPs, implying an economy approaches to a BGP only asymptotically.19 As this gure
19Passing the black broken line (the border for H˜A,t = 0) from right to left, the loci are actually accelerating. This
is because a mass of labour shifts from the R&D sector to the production sector; see the middle right panel of Figure
6. Along this black broken line, the policy functions have discontinuity; see the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Sample Paths. All dotted lines start from the rim of the gure.
shows, around the high BGP, we see many over and under shootings. Also, as discussed above,
without shocks, the model exhibits the initial state dependency. More specically, if an economy
starts from the right of the green bold line (demarcation line), it goes to the high BGP in the end
(asymptotically). On the contrary, if it starts from the left of the demarcation line, it goes to the
low BGP.
The initial state dependency is most stark, if we compare two economies starting near the point
with K˜t being almost zero and Z˜t being around 1.3; see Figure 6. On the upper left panel, both
economies move up along the demarcation line; one on the right side, the other on the left side. Their
movements are very close until they come near the middle steady state, which means that in the early
periods of their growth experience, they grow in a similar way. For this early period, the growth
is led by the capital accumulation, which we call Solow e¤ect. However, in the end, one starting
the right side of the demarcation line grows endogenously forever, while the other economy stops
R&D and it ends up with no endogenous growth. Looking into these dynamics in the actual level
(i.e., reverse-detrended variables), the upper right panel shows that due to the Solow e¤ect, both
economies experience rapid growth for the rst 80 periods (20 years) or so. The growth rate of the
high growth economy gradually declines, but after some time it successfully shifts its growth engine
from the capital accumulation to R&D. Contrarily, the growth rate of the low growth economy keeps
declining. Around t = 240 (60 years), the low growth economy shows a temporary growth boom,
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Figure 6: Transition Paths of Non-Stochastic Version. Except for the upper left panel, all variables
are in level (reverse detrended variables). For the panels other than the upper left, the bold line
shows the economy that is moving toward the high steady state (lower right "×"), while the thin line
shows the economy moving to the low steady state.
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which is caused by the mass shift of the labour from R&D to production;2021 see the middle right
panel. This also leads to the stock market boom, because such a labour shift causes an increase in
the prot of the incumbent rms; see the bottom right panel. In the long-run, capital to output ratio
is lower for the high growth economy, reecting a higher capital productivity.
5 Dynamics in Stochastic Case
In this version, we consider only two shocks; R&D productivity shock ζωA,t and time-preference
shock ζβ,t.
Table 5: Transition Probabilities
ζβ: Time-Preference Shock ζωA,t: R&D Productivity Shock
from\to 1.0 0.9799 from\to 1.0 1.5
1.0 (normal) 303/304 1/304 1.0 (normal) 979/980 1/980
0.9799 (crisis) 1/16 15/16 1.5 (R&D boom) 1/20 19/20
Table 6: Properties of Markov Transition Matrix
R&D normal boom normal boom
Financial Mkt normal normal malfunction malfunction
average duration 232.2 quarters 18.8 quarters 15.8 quarters 9.1 quarters
share in time 93.1% 1.9% 4.9% 0.1%
5.1 Transition Matrix
We assume that R&D productivity shock ζωA,t and time-preference shock ζβ,t are uncorrelated
each other, and each of them follows a two-point Markov process. In an R&D boom, the R&D
productivity is 50% higher than the normal level. More specically, the R&D productivity is 0.2 in
normal periods (see Table 2), while it is 0.3 in the R&D boom; that is, ωA = 0.2 and ζωA,t is either
1.0 or 1.5. In the periods of nancial malfunctioning, we assume that the annualized discount rate is
increased from 2% to 10%, which is translated to ζβ,t is either 1.0 or 0.9799.
We also need to determine the transition probabilities; see Table 5. First let πnb be the probability
to be R&D boom at t+1 conditional that it is normal period at t. Similarly, let πbn be the probability
to be normal period at t + 1 conditional that it is R&D boom at t. Hence, if a R&D boom lasts
20This sharp hike in the growth rate takes place in one period. This is because we have exible labour mobility; the
R&D labour quickly shifts to the production labour. We can easily add some labour friction, so that this jump in the
output growth rate would be spread out for several periods. To keep the model simple, we however opt not to do such
a cosmetic tinkering.
21This jump in labour takes place when an economy passes through the black broken line in Figure 4, along which
some policy functions have discontinuity; see the Appendix.
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20 quarters on average, 20 = 1/πbn, while such a period takes place for only 2% of entire time;
0.02 = πbn/ (πbn + πnb). These imply a typical normal period lasts 980 quarters (245 years). In this
case, πbn = 1/20 and πnb = 1/980.
Likewise, let πnc be the probability to be nancial malfunctioning at t + 1 conditional that it is
normal period at t. Similarly, let πbn be the probability to be normal period at t+1 conditional that
it is nancial malfunctioning at t. Hence, if a nancial malfunctioning period lasts 16 quarters
on average, 16 = 1/πcn. If nancial malfunctioning periods arise for 5% of the entire time,
0.05 = πnc/ (πcn + πnc). These two at the same time imply that on average normal times last 304
quarters (76 years). In this case, πcn = 1/16 and πnc = 1/304.
Because these two shocks are not correlated each other, using the Kronecker product,











πnc = 1/304, πcn = 1/16, πbn = 1/20, πnb = 1/980
5.2 Phase Diagrams
Figure 7 shows phase diagrams. Because we have four shock regimes, there are four phase diagrams
accordingly. Note that K˜t and Z˜t are both state variables, meaning that they do not jump even if a
shock hits. If a shocks hits, it is the phase diagram that changes.
On the upper left panel, we show the phase diagram in the normal time. The crossing points of
the nullclines of K˜t and Z˜t are slightly di¤erent from the non-stochastic steady states, because the
rational agents take into account the possibility of the future change in the shock regimes. Under
our parameter values, there are multiple steady states in the normal time.
The upper right panel shows the regime of R&D boom, where R&D productivity is 50% higher
than the normal regime. In this case, while the nullcline of capital changes little, the tongue shape
part of the nullcline of the R&D environment shifts down. As a result, there is only one crossing
point (high steady state). In this case, Z˜t only decreases either within the tiny triangle area or in the
area where Z˜t is very high. If this shock regime lasts forever, then, starting from any point in the
state space, an economy asymptotically approaches to the high BGP, where there is positive R&D
activities.22
The lower left panel is the case where the negative time-preference shock hits. In this case,
the required rate of return on both capital investment and the equity investment (R&D) is higher.
Hence, the tongue share area shrinks and the nullcline of K˜t shifts down. As a result, there is only
one crossing point, where there is no R&D activities; H˜A,t = 0. Because we do not assume any
exogenous growth engine, in this low BGP, the long-run growth rate is zero.
22Note that Z˜t tends to return back to zL even when H˜A,t = 0. Hence, as long as H˜A,t > 0 at the crossing point
of Z˜t = zL and the nullcline of K˜t, starting from anywhere in the state plane, an economy moves toward high steady
state. Though it is not really discernible, the upper right panes indeed satises this.
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Figure 7: Phase Diagrams with Shocks. The red circles show the steady states without shocks. The
demacation line (green bold line) exists only when there are multiple corssing points. It is computed
based on the assumption that each shock regime lasts forever.
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Finally, in the lower right panel, R&D is in boom but the nancial system is malfunctioning.
Though this shock regime may sound unusual, under our parameter assumptions, this shock regime is
extremely rare (this regime happens only 0.1% of the entire time), and hence it is not very important.
5.3 Financial Malfunctioning
Figure 8 shows the transition dynamics of the economy which starts from the high BGP in the
normal shock regime. Here, we assume that, after initial normal regime (initial 50 quarters in the
gure), a low time-preference shock hits the economy for 50 quarters23 (annual interest rate being
from 2% to 10%), and then back to the normal shock regime.
Note importantly that the state (a point on the state plane) never jumps. Instead, it is the phase
plane that shifts by a shock. Having this time-preference shock, the required rate of return becomes
higher for both production and R&D sectors, meaning that the investments in both physical capital
and R&D are both less attractive. The tongue shape part of the nullcline of Z˜t shifts up, while that
of K˜t shifts down, and hence the steady states in the normal shock regime are not stationary points
anymore; see the upper left panel. In this shock regime, the R&D environment and physical capital
both decrease (moving toward southwest). On the day of hitting the negative time-preference shock,
a mass of labour shifts from the R&D sector to the production sector, and hence we see a jump in
the output growth. During the period with lower time-preference, because the R&D environment
deteriorates, the growth rate of TFP At decreases; see the middle right panel.
At the end of the nancial crisis, it is quite crucial if the economy passes by the demarcation
line (green bold line) or not. In this example, the economy passes over the line; see the upper left
panel. Hence, even after the time-preference returns back to the normal level (upper right panel),
the economy is moving toward the low steady state (unless a large positive shock hits again). If the
economy stayed in the right side of the demarcation line, it would go back to the high BGP. Finally,
the R&D activities cease totally around t = 410. Again, at the timing of the end of R&D, output
increases sharply, which is caused by a mass labour shift from the R&D sector to the production
sector. Throughout the entire period, the output growth rate shows several spikes, mostly due to
the mass labour shifts. This may seem to be unusual, but again if we add some labour friction that
prevents an immediate job change, such spikes will be spread out to several periods.
Note that, in computing the policy functions numerically, we have assumed that a typical nancial
malfunctioning lasts 16 quarters; see Section 5.1. In this experiment, Figure 8 shows the case where
the nancial malfunctioning lasts 50 quarters, meaning that under the current parameter values, it
requires a very long-lasting nancial crisis to be trapped by the low growth region. We could interpret
this that such a trap can take place only rarely, but unfortunately the required length of the nancial
disruption sharply depends on δZ , which is one of controversial parameter. If we have a larger value
for δZ , it takes a shorter period to push the economy to the low growth region.
23In particular, given near zero H˜Y,t, the depreciation rate of the R&D environment is crucial in determining the
speed of the movements in the state plane. If δZ is larger, Z˜t decreases more quickly, hence it requires shorter periods
to pass over the demarcation line. In this example, we assume that the nancial malfunction lasts for 50 quarters, but
depending on δZ , it could be shorter or longer.
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During High Discount Rate




After High Discount Rate
Figure 8: Financial Crisis. This simulation assumes that after initial 50 normal periods, the economy
experiences low time-preference shock (high interest rate) for 50 quarters (12.5 years), and then it
goes back to the normal shock regime. Except for the upper two panels, all variables are in actual
level. For the upper two panels, three "×" show the crossing points of the nullclines under the
normal shock regime. In the area left of the black broken line, no labour is dedicated to R&D
activities; H˜A,t = 0. This gure plots the same green bold lines in the upper two panels, which is
the demarcation line in the normal shock regime. Note that there is no demarcation line for the high
discount rate shock regime.
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trend of  TFP
Figure 9: This gure is based on the same simulated data as Figure 8. Equity return is the sum of
capital and income gains. The discount rate is 200bp higher than the normal between 51st to 100th
quarters. TFP is normalized to be zero at the start of the simulation, and its linear trend is based
on the rst 50 quarters.
Compare Figure 9 with Figures 2 and 1. It focuses on the stock return and the log of TFP for the
rst 200 periods, which are generated from the same simulated data as in Figure 8. During the period
of high discount rate, the stock return is rather higher, because of (i) the higher required return due
to the lower discount factor and (ii) the labour shift from the R&D sector to the production sector.





We can see the downward shift of the TFP growth trend during the stock market boom. Hence,
importantly, there is a discrepancy between aggregate economy and individual rms. In aggregate, a
low level of inventions decreases the aggregate output growth rate by reducing the growth rate of At.
In contrast, at the individual rms level, the output and the prot of each incumbent rm increases
when they can attract more labour at a lower wage cost.
Note that the log of TFP shows another kink around t = 410 (omitted in Figure 9) at which there
is a mass labour shift. After that, under our parameter values, the TFP growth rate stays at zero.
5.4 R&D Boom
Motivated by Rostows takeo¤, Figure 10 shows the e¤ect of an improvement of the R&D
productivity for a long time period. It plots the transition dynamics of the economy which starts
from the low crossing point of the nullclines in the normal shock regime. After initial normal regime
(60 quarters), the R&D productivity increases by 50% for 40 quarters, and then back to the normal
shock regime.
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Figure 10: R&D Boom. This simulation assumes that, after intial 60 normal quarters, the high R&D
productivity lasts for 40 quarters (10 years), and then back to the normal shock regime. Except for
the upper two panels, all variables are in actual level. For the upper two panels, three "×" show the
crossing points of the nullclines under the normal shock regime. In the area left of the black broken
line, no labour is dedicated to R&D activities; H˜A,t = 0. This gure plots the same green bold lines
in the upper two panels, which is the demarcation line in the normal shock regime. Note that there
is no demarcation line for the R&D boom regime.
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In this scenario, the region where Z˜t increases expands, while the nullcline of K˜t shifts only a little.
Because R&D is more productive, labour shifts to the R&D sector. Capital level relative to output
mildly decreases. When the R&D boom ends, some portion of labour shifts back to the production
sector leading to a sharp increase in output growth (10%) and stock return (150%). These large
numbers may sound implausible, but again recall that our model does not have any labour friction;
if we add some mechanism that generates a gradual labour mobility, then these spikes will be spread
out over some periods.
Again, what is crucial to escape from the low steady state is that the economy needs to pass over
the demarcation line by the time that the R&D boom ends, as in this example (see the upper left
panel). If the economy stays in the area left of the demarcation line, then it will go back to the low
steady state after the R&D boom.
6 Discussions
6.1 Model Interpretations and Anecdotal Evidence
Our model is very simple and stylized. In addition, we opt to have adjustment devices such as
investment adjustment cost as little as possible. The model predicts some extreme values such as
zero R&D labour in the low BGP, but we can easily remedy these things by tinkering the model. But,
such cosmetic techniques makes the model unnecessary complicated without adding any interesting
economic intuitions.
Nonetheless, our model maintains the key intuitions. First, in the model, the R&D and the
production sectors compete in the factor markets. As discussed above, this idea itself is not new,
in the sense that one of the leading exposition of the natural resource curse is that the protable
sector (natural resource extraction) crowds out the sector with high productivity (or strong spill-over
e¤ects) in the factor markets. In our model, the R&D sector competes only with the production
sector only in the labour market. In this respect, we could extend the model so that it could be the
nancial intermediary that squeezes the R&D sector in the labour market. Indeed, anecdotally it is
often said that those who obtained the training as a rocket scientist are now engaged in the nancial
engineering. Second, because of this, something good in the production sector may not be good for
R&D, which we shortly come back to this issue in the discussion of policy implications. Third, it
is very important to provide the risk-money (funds that can take risks) to the R&D sector. This
is because (a) the R&D activities are very risky business; (b) the new idea has a stock value (not
a one-o¤ ow value); (c) the supply of the risk-money is very sensitive the required rate of return
(risk-premium plus risk-free rate). Hence, the nancial market is important for the technological
growth. Again, though it is only anecdotal, the country which has the most developed nancial
markets is the country where innovations and inventions are most active, which is the U.S.
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6.2 Policy Implications
Again, the most important implications of this model are (a) production sector may crowd out
the R&D activities and (b) nancial frictions have very strong impacts on R&D incentives. The
following discussions are based on these two.
6.2.1 Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy
First, like Comin and Gertler (2006, AER), the business cycle shocks can have very persistent
e¤ect in our model. Hence, at least potentially, demand control policies such as a counter-cyclical
scal expenditure and monetary policy also a¤ect the long-run growth. However, quantitatively, their
results are very di¤erent from ours, because what we are concerned are long-lasting shocks such as
nancial crisis or R&D boom. In the extreme, ignoring the e¤ect during the transition dynamics, a
permanent change in the scal expenditure does not a¤ect the BGPs, because, while it enhances the
rm value which stimulates R&D activities, it also stimulate the labour demand in the production
sector, squeezing R&D labour input. Also, in the case of Comin and Gertler (2006), there is an
intertemporal substitution e¤ect. That is, if an improvement in the production productivity is only
temporary, then there is an incentive to work more intensively during such a period; such an e¤ect
is absent in the comparative statics and is small in our case with long lasting shocks.
For the traditional monetary policy, we can say a similar story. It may sound contradictory
because we also nd that the time preference shock has a sharp impact on R&D. Although this
paper does not include the price stickiness, without expanding the state space dimensionality, we can
add (a) Rotemberg type price stickiness in F-goods prices and (b) Taylor rule where nominal interest
rate responds only to ination.24 In this extended version, if we add a permanent negative monetary
policy shock, the steady states change little. The intuition is similar to the standard discussion
about discretion vs. commitment policies. That is, because we are interested in, for example, the
long-lasting shock that captures a nancial crisis type situation, the monetary policy reaction is
also long-lasting. In our rational framework, agents rationally anticipate that such an expansionary
monetary policy lasts long. Hence, the ination rate adjusts and such a low ination rate makes the
real interest rate back to a point near the normal level, meaning that the intertemporal substitution
does not work. Recall that both real and nominal interest rates are higher during the nancial
malfunctioning in the quantitative exercise in Section 5.3. Note that, since ination and deation
are both costly under Rotemberg type price stickiness (which is also true under Calvo pricing), they
play a similar role to the negative e¢ciency shock ζY , but as we have already discussed it does not
a¤ect BGPs.
In sum, both scal expenditure and traditional interest rate policy are not e¤ective for the long-
lasting shocks. If the monetary policy authority can implement a commitment policy, it may prevent
from falling into the low BGP, but it is not really clear if such a commitment policy can be maintained
for a long time period. Though it is beyond our scope, however, a non-traditional monetary policy
24We cannot have a version of Taylor rule, where monetary policy also responds to output growth or output gap,
because output growth and output gap both depend on the BGPs. We do not know a single rule (an algebraic
expression) which ts to all the BGPs in the same way.
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such as quantitative easing may be e¤ective to the extent that it improves the functionality of the
nancial intermediary as a fund conduit from investors to inventors.
Some long-run industrial policies that do not aim to manage business cycle uctuations may
have a positive e¤ect to support the long-run growth. Although it is counter-intuitive, however, in
our model, for example, improving the competitiveness of the industries may have no e¤ect on the
long-run TFP growth. Again, if the production sector becomes more productive, then it may absorb
the resources that would be otherwise dedicated to the R&D sector. Instead, the model implies that
the long-term structural policies that has an a¢nity to R&D, such as education, are preferable.
6.2.2 Big Push and Poverty Trap
The idea of the big push, though rather a casual idea, is that to escape from the poverty trap a
big push, such as a large scale foreign aid, is necessary. Empirically, however, Esterly (2006, J Econ
Growth), using a country-base panel data set, nds rather negative evidence against the view that
the quality of government, the foreign aid and education spending help the takeo¤s or the escape
from the poverty trap. Our model indeed tells us that we need a big push to escape from the low
BGP. But, at the same time, our model predicts that simple improvement in the production e¢ciency
and an increase in government expenditure as a demand control do not stimulate R&D activities. If
a foreign aid for example improves the productivity in the production sector, it rather could squeeze
the R&D. That is, a more productive production may absorb resources that could be spent for the
R&D. Hence, our model implies that it matters what kind of push it is. Actually, we argue that,
depending on its type, in many cases, ODA improves the income of recipient countries but it may
not lead to a takeo¤.
Related to this, Azariadis and Stachurski (2005, Handbook) mention that "..., until the last few
hundred years no state successfully managed the transition to what we now call modern, self-sustaining
growth". They also discuss the Industrial Revolution in Britain, which could be understood as a big
push. As they also mention, however, another puzzle is why such a science-based production regime
has not been spread out countries outside Europe. In our model, the explosion of scientic ndings
prior to the industrial revolution can be interpreted as a large shift in the R&D productivity parameter
ωA. However, an increase in ωA is only a necessary condition; the takeo¤s also require the institutional
capital Zt be high enough. In this respect, Max Weber discussed that capitalism has developed rst
in the countries such where Calvinism was inuential. Certainly, interpreting Calvanism as our Zt is
too heroic, though. Nonetheless, our model suggests that the societys attitude or soft-infrastructure
to support the R&D activities are the key to the successful takeo¤s.
6.3 Convergence or Divergence
This subsection discusses the convergence. In our model, assuming that the parameters are
the same for all countries, (a) there is a convergence mechanism through the Solow e¤ect (capital
accumulation) in the transition period; (b) within the group of countries which grow along the same
BGP (after the transition period), all of them grow at the same rate, meaning that the gap in the
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income level is unchanged asymptotically; (c) between the high and the low BGPs, the income is
rather diverging. Note that Romer model also shares the same prediction as (a) and (b).
The empirical ndings seem to be rather supportive to the divergence. The following discussion
owes Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2004, Handbook). First, in the growth regression type analysis
(often called β-convergence), within a group of countries (or regions) which share similar properties
(similar parameter values), such as U.S. states, European countries, and Japanese prefectures, there
are strong evidence of convergence (absolute convergence). Unfortunately, the standard endogenous
growth models, including ours, do not match this nding. The evidence for the β-convergence is
mixed if a data set includes a wider range of countries. Second, in the distributional approach (often
called σ-convergence),25 the evidence rather supports the multimodality.26 Often, polarization, or
twin peaks, is found,27, and, even if a convergence is found in the long-run, the period of twin peaks is
estimated to last for a very long period.28 While the regression type analyses lose a lot of information
included in the distribution, the estimation precision tends to be low in the distributional approach.
Anyway, though there are some evidence of the convergence as well, all in all it seems that the
empirical evidence is rather supportive to the bimodality.
6.4 Scale E¤ect
As discussed by Jones (1999 AER, 1995 QJE), the class of models such as Romers variety
expansion has the scale e¤ect; that is, the TFP growth rate is increasing in the population size. This
is empirically not supported at all. By assuming a constant population level, we avoid considering the
e¤ects of population growth in this paper. However, our model does not have the scale e¤ect due to
a simple assumption, which some readers may feel is rather an easy tinkering, though. That is, while
we assume that (a) it is the institutional capital per capita that determines the labour productivity
in the R&D sector, (b) the aggregate capital per capita is increasing in the share of the R&D labour.
This can be regarded as an easy tinkering; to see this, consider the case with ωZ = 0 (still HA,t can







That is, the TFP growth is proportional to the share of R&D labour.
We could follow Jones approach with 0 < ηA < 1 at least potentially.
At+1 = A
new




We have obtained the equilibrium equations with this formulation. The main drawback is a
computational burden. Actually, it turns out that we need to have one more additional state variable,
25See for example Anderson 2003 and Anderson and Ge 2004.
26See Paap and van Dijik (1998).
27See for example Bianchi (1997) and Quah (1997).
28See Azariadis and Stachurski (2003).
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which is a ratio of population to the technology level Ξt = Ht−1/A
ηA
t . This is followed by a non-






Ξt. Hence, Jones approach
requires us to increase the dimension of the state space. Another reason why we did not follow Jones
approach is that his method is not really perfect anyway. For example, TFP growth rate γA,t+1 is
asymptotically determined by the population growth rate γ H,t, which is not really plausible. Under
our formulation, the TFP growth rate is mainly determined by the R&D population share but not
directly determined by neither the population size or the population growth rate. Our modeling
device itself is an easy trick but the resultant model property is rather consistent with the empirical
regularities.
Anyway, because the scale e¤ect is a rather profound issue in this area, we conne ourselves not
to discuss its e¤ect in this paper. One important note related to this is that, depending on the
assumptions, the population growth rate may have a very strong e¤ect on the R&D, because the
change in the population growth rate a¤ects the e¤ective discount factor. As we have already seen,
the discount factor has the most important parameter in our model.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies a simple endogenous growth model to explain growth slowdowns. It is designed
to explain, for example, the middle income trap often observed in the south-east Asian countries,
the U.K.s productivity puzzle after the Great Recession and the lost decades of Japan in a unied
framework. It is based on the Romers (1990, JPE) variety expansion model with additional state
variable, which we call the R&D environment. Our model is fairly realistic in the sense that it allows
us to do calibration exercises which are rather standard in the business cycle studies. Hence, we can
apply a similar method to Comin and Gertler (2006), but the quantitative results are very di¤erent
from theirs, because we are more interested in shocks that last for quite long periods.
The R&D environment in this paper loosely captures a wide range of social and institutional
environment surrounding R&D activities. We assume that it has the following two properties, of
which the latter generates an externality; (a) the better the R&D environment is, the higher the R&D
productivity is; and (b) society accumulates the R&D environment via R&D activities. Together with
the non-negativity constraint of the labour supply, this additional state variable generates multiple
steady states (balanced growth paths, BGPs).
The main properties of the model are as follows. First, in the steady states, improving the
production e¢ciency and increasing the government expenditure is neutral in the endogenous growth
rate, while the R&D is very sensitive to the nancial e¢ciency. The key intuition is that the R&D and
production sectors compete in the factor markets (labour market in our model). On the positive side,
a higher output level increases rm prot and rm value. But, on the negative side, a higher output
means that the production sector absorbs more labour, which raises the wage rate. Because the R&D
sector takes labour as an input, a higher wage means a higher cost, which discourages inventions. In
our model, these two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other. In contrast, our numerical simulations show
that the R&D activities are very sensitive to the nancial market e¢ciency. Because a higher risk-
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premium on the equity investment makes the stock price lower, the reward to the invention becomes
lower when the interest rate is high.
Second, in terms of the transition dynamics, if an economy has a long nancial malfunctioning
period, it experiences rises and falls of the stock return, followed by an almost-permanent growth
slowdown. The simulation result sheds light on the nancial boom and bust often observed prior to
the growth slowdowns. In the model, an increase in the stock return is partly a direct result of a high
required rate of return caused by the nancial malfunctioning. In addition, because discouraged R&D
labour shifts to the production sector, output per rm and hence its prot increases. Importantly,
there is a discrepancy between aggregate output and the individual rm prots. In aggregate, if
the R&D sector attracts more labour, then they invent new products more, implying a faster TFP
growth. For the individual rms, on the other hand, output per rm does not increase regardless of
the invention of new variety, because a new invention is commercialized by a new rm. A high level
of R&D activities rather is harmful for individual rm prot, because the R&D sector absorbs more
labour by increasing the labour cost.
These model properties have a couple of policy implications. First, traditional scal and monetary
polices are not very useful to prevent an economy from falling into the low BGP. Instead, long term
structural policies that improves directly the R&D productivity or that improves nancial e¢ciency
are e¤ective. Second, a big-push is required for underdeveloped countries to take o¤. But, classical
ODA that improves production e¢ciency has little e¤ects.
Finally, we admit that this model is fairly stylized and hence are rather reluctant to take all the
simulated results at their face value. Nonetheless, some key implications seem to be valid in reality.
For example, in purely model-free empirical studies, people often nd the importance of the nancial
deepening in economic growth. One of the messages in this paper is that such an importance of the
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition
The proof is, though tedious, straightforward. First of all, for the low steady state HA,ss, the
growth rate does not depend on any parameters simply because it is zero.
In the case of the high steady state, wage equalization holds (interior solution).






Hence, the equation of rm prot implies
(2e) : Π˜ss = (1− α˜)αλ
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Hence, treating H˜A,ss, γA,ss, Λssγv,ss and Π˜ss/V˜ss as intermediate variables, we can nd Z˜ss that
satises εZ = 0.






(2c) : γA,ss = ωAZ˜ssH˜A,ss + (1− δA)




























where (∗) denes the discount factor for the rm prot; see (2d) in the main text. Hence, any
parameters that do not appear here do not a¤ect none of R&D environment Zss, R&D labour H˜A,ss,
TFP growth γA,ss and price/earnings ratio (V˜ss/Π˜ss) in the high steady state. This completes the
proof. Note nally that there are two Z˜ss that satises εZ = 0, the lower of which is the R&D
environment at the middle explosive steady state.
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B Solution Algorithm and Some Policy Functions
To solve the system of equations (2), we employed a Eular equation iteration (a projection
method). We rst assume arbitrary policy functions of the dynamic jump variables (C˜t and V˜t)
as functions of the state variables (Z˜t and K˜t). With these policy functions, we can infer C˜t+1 and
V˜t+1 and their expected values by (2). Then, we solve (2) for the dynamic jump variables at each
node point on the state plane. We label these solved dynamic jump vairables as C˜ ′t and V˜
′
t with
prime "′". In general, C˜ ′t and V˜
′
t are di¤erent from C˜t and V˜t. Hence, we update the policy functions




t . We repeat this until the policy functions coincide with the solved
values (time iteration).
Figure 11 shows some selected policy functions for the non-stochastic case. To enhance visibility,
in this gure, we use a much fewer grid points than the actual computation. Without shocks, the
steady states (the red stars in each panel) must be on the policy functions. Note that the policy
functions of Z˜t+1, H˜A,t and γA,t have discontinuity along the black broken line (border of the area
with H˜A,t = 0) in Figure 4, though it is not visible for Z˜t+1. This discontinuity causes a jump in the
transition dynamics. While C˜t and V˜t have kink along the same line, K˜t+1 is smooth in the entire
state space.
Figure 11: Selected Policy Functions. All variables are detrended. The red stars (∗) show the
balanced growth paths. The grid points are not equi-distanced.
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